• But the real difficulties start once people become capable of judging the differences between people.  “[T]hey acquired imperceptibly the ideas of beauty and merit, which soon gave rise to feelings of preference.”  (That one can imperceptibly acquire such novel ideas is quite dubious, though!)  While things were pretty idyllic, inequality began.  “Whoever sang or danced best, whoever was the handsomest, the strongest, the most dextrous, or the most eloquent, came to be of most consideration;  and this was the first step towards inequality, and at the same time towards vice.”
• But to maintain a society, people needed morality.  There was a balance between indolence and activity.  Then for quite a while things were pretty good.  It is here that we have the “noble savages” of European myth.  While there are seeds of evil, namely of inequality, things generally are pretty good.  It is in this state that human beings were meant to remain. 
• “[A]ll subsequent advances have been apparently so many steps towards the perfection of the individual, but in reality towards the decrepitude of the species.”
• Observe a curious fact.  Rousseau talks as if being natural is good—a sort of natural law theory.  But at the same time, it sounds like the optimal state is one in the middle, when people have developed some skills.  So it is natural to develop some skills.  But then comes an unnatural development—“the decrepitude of the species.”  Yet, what grounds does Rousseau have for saying that this development is unnatural?  Only, it seems, that it is a bad development.  But then it is not bad because it is unnatural, but counts as unnatural because it is bad.
• Observe, too, that the decline of the human race is caused by the ascendancy of the individual.  We each want to perfect ourselves, to be better than others, etc.  And humankind suffers through the inequality that results.  Yet the driving force behind the inequality, according to Rousseau, is our interdependence.  We need others, we are no longer independent.  So paradoxically, it is our interdependence that drives us to perfect ourselves individually.  Why?  Presumably because our interdependence makes competition possible.  I and you can only compete at providing some service (e.g., music) to others if someone else is in some way dependent on that service. 
• It seems that Rousseau thinks that significant interdependence is unnatural.  This is to be contrasted with the view of Aristotle and Aquinas who think that our essence is to be social animals.
• The interdependence led to specialization.  Tasks as difficult as metallurgy cannot be done by someone who is also making her own clothes and growing her own food.  But specialization requires barter.  So specialization led to a developed system of private property.
• Inequality then results because some are more talented than others.
• Interdependence, inequality and property then are all tightly interconnected.  And from these spring evils: “Insatiable ambition, the thirst of raising their respective fortunes, … a vile propensity to injure one another, … a secret jealousy ….”
• This gives an argument for the badness of private tradeable property.  Private tradeable property implies interdependence and inequality.  Inequality then leads to all of the above evils.
• Criticisms:
• But why should inequality lead to these?  Take jealousy.  Suppose you gain more than I.  Why should I be jealous?  Why shouldn’t I instead be glad for your sake, enjoy your good fortune vicariously?
• Suppose we have a state where all have the same amount, and then suddenly some gain more while no one loses.  Sure, this would produce inequality.  But why should this inequality make anyone miserable?  Why wouldn’t those who did not gain materially become happier through vicarious enjoyment of the goods that the rich have?
• Of course, we know that that is not what happens.  People do become jealous.  But what I’ve just said shows that it is not inequality alone that is responsible for jealousy.  Likewise, inequality is not alone responsible for “insatiable ambition”.  One needs inequality plus selfishness.
• Now, Rousseau probably thinks we are naturally selfish.  And so this selfishness plus inequality might give rise to ambition.  But it seems Rousseau talks not just about ambition in the sense of trying to do the best one can, but ambition in the competitive sense of trying to do better than others.  And even if one grants the assumption of selfishness, it does not follow that there will have to be the competitive sort of ambition, the kind that does not seek just to do well for oneself, but to do well for oneself as compared to others.  (Cf. the parents who care more about the rank a child has in the class than about what the exact grades are.)
• This suggests that inequality, property and interdependence are not the sole root of the evils Rousseau is thinking about.  One needs to add some particular predispositions, such as a disposition to jealousy or to being better than others.  But why should there be such predispositions?  After all, prior to the emergence of inequality, property and interdependence, such predispositions would seem to be useless.  So why would nature have given them to us?
• This suggests in turn that the true story about the rise of evil is going to be different.  Maybe it is simply that people choose to be wicked, regardless of inequality, etc.  But Rousseau might still be able to say that inequality gives a field for such choices.  Still, this is not obvious.  For if one wants to be evil, even without social inequalities one can do it—I can go beat up my neighbor “just for fun.”  True, one might think that without there being any property to be gained from harming others one wouldn’t bother to harm others.  But why would one bother to be, e.g., jealous in any case?  Jealousy does not make the jealous person happier.  (Indeed it seems that if human beings are naturally selfish, then it is hard to see why they would be naturally jealous.)

o        On the other hand, maybe the reason the competitive emotions arise is that in this state of society, one is competing with other people to provide commodities.  Thus, the products that one is oneself producing do not merely need to be good, but they need to be better than those of others.  Thus, it makes sense to strive to do better than others.  And it makes sense to feel bad if one doesn't, since that impels one to do better.

o        I don't think this response is sufficient to defend Rousseau.  We need to distinguish two kinds of ambition (1) to be better off than others, and (2) to produce better products or provide better services than others do.  It is type (1) ambition that seems to be the most vicious sort.  But type (1) ambition is not an inevitable result of the kind of "selfish" free-market system that Rousseau criticizes.  Why?  Because one is not competing with others in happiness, but in providing products and services.  Similarly, a jealousy of people who are better off than one is does not seem an inevitable result.  Now a type (2) ambition might well be a result of a competitive system of production.  But a type (2) ambition seems significantly more innocent than a type (1) ambition.  Likewise, a type (2) jealousy, i.e., a jealousy of the better workmanship of others, seems more innocent than a type (1) jealousy, i.e., a jealousy of someone's good fortune.  Moreover, as the ideal of sportsmanship illustrates, it is possible to have type (2) competition--competition at trying to do better than others--while remaining respectful of others, etc.  Nonetheless, as the practice of sports illustrates, the ideal is hard to attain.

2. There are two relevant claims in Rousseau.  The first is that it is quite natural and good for human beings to exist without private property—they did so for quite a while.  The second is that inequality is bad.

• On private property.  Locke gives this argument:  Suppose I have an apple that I have picked and I eat it.  Everyone should admit that eventually the apple is mine.  Certainly after I have swallowed it, you have no right to dredge it up again to eat it yourself.  But at what point does it become mine?  When in my digestive tract?  Mouth?  Hand?  Locke thinks there is no logical point here where to draw the line.  He thinks that the most logical place to draw the line is when the apple is picked by me or maybe when the field is planted.  That is when property is acquired.  But, in any case, we all agree that eventually there is private property.
• On inequality.  Particularly galling seem to be inequalities that come from things people are not themselves responsible for, e.g., the fact that some people are just genetically or environmentally blessed with some talents.
• But suppose we have a community where everyone is equally well off.  But a really bad influenza epidemic is coming and will cause everyone who is unvaccinated to get sick (let us assume).  We have exactly one dose of vaccine against the disease.  Should we throw it out, or should we use it, say via a contest or lottery?  Suppose we have a lottery for who gets it.  Then as a result of the lottery, we get inequality—the winner doesn’t get sick, while everyone else does.  True, it would be better if everyone equally was healthy.  But why would it be better if everyone were sick than if everyone but one were sick?
• The only thing better about the state of affairs of everyone being sick seems to be that there aren’t jealousies.  But the jealousies seem to be a moral failing of those who are jealous.  It is not that we are treating them unfairly.
• Note that in this example it is not the fault of the people who are going to get sick that they didn’t get vaccine.  It was random.
• But likewise many (though not all) environmental influences on talents are random.  Are the random ones OK, but the non-random not?  Why not?

And then there is the Social Contract, which we did not discuss, since I was just trying to get some ideas relevant to an opposition with Aquinas and Locke.