fact has a wholly contingent part. (Why? Because we can take
the necessary parts of the fact, and subtract them.)
there is a maximal wholly contingent fact C.
has a cause.
cause does not overlap C.
the cause is necessary.
cause is not a mere aggregate—parts can exist apart from other parts.
cause does not have measurable properties.[[finished last class here]]
cause is not located in a part of space or in the whole of space.
cause is not a physical object.
run the teleological argument!
James Ross objection:
Did God cause that he caused the universe? Let C*
be this event. This is not wholly contingent.
Assume that in every world there is exactly one necessary
being whose activity explains all contingent facts.
of power states.
one necessary being whose free actions explain all the contingent truths
explanation of all contingent facts lies in one being.
- Independence -->
- Unchangingness. Why? (If changing, then
could have already been otherwise? And what explains that he is as
spatially. If a being can be absent in one place, it can be absent
altogether. Likewise, cannot have lacks in self.
Parts induce bounds. Cannot have “difference and diversity in the
manner of existence”, else we don’t have necessity.
Its existence comes from “absolute necessity”, without anything to
differentiate this necessity. (What is this “absolute
necessity”?) Also: If we had two independent beings, they could
exist apart, and hence wouldn’t be necessary beings.
more excellent than the effect, else the excellence in the effect came
from nowhere. Hence intelligence was found in the cause.
- Objection: Things can
arise from lesser things.
Intelligence is an arrangement of matter.
- Response: This comes
from thinking that compounds are something other than what they are
compounded of. Two roots for the error: (a) Some things that we think
are compounds are actually distinct, as in the case of colors; (b) Some
things are still just compounds, though they seem to be more.
- Besides, the world is really
good, so intelligence is needed. (Nice touch: Uses recent (then!)
empirical data that life doesn't arise from non-life.)
- If motion didn't come from
intelligence, where did it come from?
- There is no action without
- And if God were a necessary
agent, modal fatalism would result.
- But there is a necessity of fitness.
- Teleology implies that the
creator is a free agent. (Why? Because final causes act only on
- Non-agential causes are moved movers.
- Infinite power. All powers of things derive from the
first cause, and (hence?) are wholly dependent on it.
- God can create free
beings—because (a) freedom is possible (as God has it) and (b) freedom is
communicable, as is everything that doesn’t “imply self-existence and
absolute independence”. This is
compatible with foreknowledge if (a) holds.
- Freedom yields an answer to
the problem of evil.
- Omnipresence -->
omniscience. (But what about the future?)
- No external influence,
perfect independent happiness and perfect knowledge --> moral
- Moral vs. natural
attributes. The moral ones are
founded on the will’s necessity of following motives.
idea: God is first.
No passive potentiality. Something is needed to move the merely potential
to the actual. So anything merely
potential is not first. (Could a part
of God be potential? Well, then, it’s
the actual parts that would be first, and hence it is they that would
be God. Note: Aquinas owes us an
argument that God cannot be a part of a composite.)
Not identical with matter—matter has potentiality.
Nothing unnatural—since that would require composition.
Not a body.
Bodies have parts, potentiality of subdivision, are movable and finite.
God is his own essence.
Else there is composition. Also, the
essence of a thing is either the thing or a kind of cause of itself.
Existence either depends on essence,
or essence on existence, or both on a third item. If the existence depends on the essence or on
a third item, the existence of the first cause is not absolutely first. If the essence depends on existence, then the
thing’s having existence is independent of what sort of a thing it is, and that’s
absurd. And that by which something
exists is its existence. Hence, God’s
existence cannot be different from God, or else God would exist by something
other than himself.
No accidents. Since
he is existence itself. Moreover, if God
were to cause himself to have some quality, he’d have
to have that quality already in some way.
And hence he’d be composite.
being isn’t the specification of a genus.
11. Good. Goodness = perfection, completeness. A being with no potentiality must be perfect. Also: immovable movers move by being
desired. But only being good moves per se.
The good is being in act. God is
act. Also, God is good because he
spreads existence motivated by himself.
is goodness itself. For, goodness = act,
and God is his own being. Moreover, if
one has good but isn’t the good, then one is good by participation, so there must be a first
good. Moreover, participation implies a
kind of potentiality.
13. Intelligence. Unmovedly originating motion involves appetite. Also, first mover must have forms as
universals in it. Moreover, intelligent
movers in the world are instruments of God.
Hence God is intelligent. Also, forms
are understood = forms are apart from matter.
Also, God lacks no perfection, since then there would be a way of
specifying him by difference. Moreover,