Psychological Connectedness vs. Continuity

· A relation R is transitive iff whenever x is R-related to y and y is R-related to z, then x is R-related to z

· Identity is transitive

· Psychological connectedness is not transitive

· Any non-transitive relation can be extended to a transitive relation via chains: e.g., parent-of to ancestor-of

· Psychological continuity is what we get by extending psychological connectedness

Mattering 1

1. (Premise) If survival is defined in terms of psychological continuity, then psychological continuity is always important.

2. (Premise) Psychological continuity is not always important.

3. Therefore, survival is not defined in terms of psychological continuity. (by 1 and 2)

4. (Premise) Personal identity is defined in terms of psychological continuity.

5. (Premise) If survival is defined in terms of personal identity and personal identity is defined in terms of psychological continuity, then survival is defined in terms of psychological continuity.  

6. Therefore, if survival is defined in terms of personal identity, then survival is defined in terms of psychological continuity. (by 4 and 5)

7. Therefore, survival is not defined in terms of personal identity. (by 3 and 6)

Mattering 2

1. If the existence of a future self is important in the same way that the existence of a future self that one is identical with is important, then one survives as that future self.

2. In branching situations, the existence of a future self that one is not identical with is important in the same way as the existence of a future self that one is identical with.

3. So, in branching situations, one survives as a future self that one is not identical with.

A Swinburne-Like Dualistic Argument

1. (Premise) x splits into y and z.
2. (Premise) One of the following is true:
1. x=y and x¹z
2. x=z and x¹y
3. x=y and x=z
4. x¹y and x¹z
3. (Premise) A purely physical description of the world neither says nor explains which one of (a)-(d) is true.
4. (Premise) If a purely physical description D of the world is complete, for any truth p, the description either says or explains that p.
5. Therefore, a purely physical description of the world is incomplete.

Note 1: If (1) is not actually true, then the conclusion is that a physical description of the world would be incomplete if (1) were true.

Possibility Arguments

1. I could have lived Napoleon’s life.
2. I couldn’t have lived Napoleon’s life if I am purely physical.
3. So, I am not purely physical.